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Academic Capitalism in Japan: National University Incorporation and 
Special Zones for Structural Reform
2To support the “knowledge” infrastructure of Japan in the 21st century, with the ever-
increasing expectations placed on national universities, increasingly strong demands are 
being placed on individual universities to clarify the mission and function expected of them, 
and to effectively realize these missions and functions…In order to promote reform of 
national universities through incorporation it is necessary to expand the discretion of 
universities in terms of management, by relaxing wherever possible the day-to-day 
regulations that hinder the smooth management of universities.
-  Japanese Ministry of Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology, 2002, p. 2 and 4.
In the past decade, industrialized countries have been confronted with the challenge of 
reforming their century-old higher education systems in order to remain competitive in the global 
knowledge economy. National universities face global competition on the one hand and domestic 
constraints such as enrollment decline and increasing demand for public accountability on the other. 
As Daun (2002:1) puts it, “almost everywhere in the world, educational systems are now under the 
pressure to produce individuals for global competition… Although there is no consensus as to the 
nature and scope of globalization, nor its beginnings, the discourse since the 1980s continues to 
intensify and increase, and education is expected to respond.” The multiple forces from without and 
within have created increasing ideological as well as financial pressure for decentralization, 
privatization, and marketization of higher education systems (Zemsky 2005; Yano 2005; Altbach et 
al. 2001; Carnoy 2000; and Mok 2000). Universities across the US, UK, Australia, New Zealand, 
and Canada have been undergoing structural reforms, often as part of larger public sector reform in 
accordance with a New Public Management (NPM) framework that focuses on institutional 
performance based on leadership, entrepreneurship, and accountability (Talbot et al. 2005; W illiams 
2003; Jones 2003; and Harman 2001).   
While the impact of globalization on national educational restructuring has been amply 
documented by educational researchers in the past two decades (Stromquist and Monkman 2000; 
Burbules and Torres 2000; Sadlak 2000; Arnove and Torres 1999; Slaughter and Leslie 1998; and 
Introduction
A New Image of National University Corporations,
3Green 1997), few studies have looked at reforms in non Anglo-Saxon countries and, in particular, 
those with traditionally strong state-controlled educational systems such as Japan. Faced with a 
protracted economic recession since the early 1990s, national universities in Japan have been under 
the same political scrutiny as their Western counterparts. In 1998, the policy advisory body 
University Council issued a comprehensive reform agenda entitled “A Vision for Universities in the 
21st Century and Reform Measures: To Be Distinctive Universities in a Competitive Environment,” 
which aims at the individualization, diversification, and internationalization of Japanese universities. 
In 2003, the Japanese government passed the Law on Special Zones for Structural Reform that 
allows business corporations to establish universities in deregulated “special zones” throughout 
Japan in order to revitalize university education for national economic growth. The following year, 
Japan passed the most important educational reform law since the founding of the Imperial 
University system in 1886 and the passing of the Fundamental Education Law in 1947: the National 
University Corporation Law to “develop independent universities that conform to the highest 
international standards in a competitive environment” (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 
Science, and Technology, MEXT, 2002). While falling short of outright privatizing the national 
university sector, this law introduces private sector concepts in the management of national 
universities, allowing autonomy in budgeting, non-civil servant personnel recruitment, curriculum, 
external expert management, and third-party evaluations. 
Why were these two reform measures taken despite opposition from both MEXT that had 
traditionally a strong grip on educational policy in Japan and universities that had insisted on their 
autonomy throughout postwar Japan? This chapter looks at the domestic political forces that shape 
“academic capitalism” in Japan. Through an analysis of the National University Corporation Law 
and the Law on Special Zones for Structural Reform, I make a two-fold argument. First, academic 
capitalism—“the pursuit of market and marketlike activities to generate external revenues” and the 
4“internal embeddedness of the profit-oriented activities as a point of reorganization by higher 
education institutions to develop their own capacity” (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004: 11)—has 
emerged in its specific forms in Japan through incorporation and deregulation since the early 2000s 
in the larger context of administrative reforms by the leading conservative Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP). Second, opposition from university faculty and staff unions has largely failed due to 
structural weaknesses of unions in Japan. This chapter is organized in four parts. Part II discusses 
the 2003 National University Corporation Law and the 2002 Law on Special Zones for Structural 
Reform. Part III looks at the reform process, tracing the ideological pressure from the Liberal 
Democratic Party since the 1980s and the bureaucratic battle between MEXT and the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). Part IV analyzes the opposition by various stakeholders, 
focusing in particular on faculty and staff union response. I conclude on the conflicts between 
academic capitalism and commitments to the postwar social contract in Japan.
The modern Japanese higher education system established in the Meiji era was modeled 
after the German and French system, characterized by strong state control and “immobilist politics” 
(Schoppa 1990). It is comprised of universities (national, public, and private), junior colleges, 
colleges of technology, and specialized training colleges. Even though private universities constitute 
over 70% both in terms of institution and student enrollment numbers, national and public 
universities established in each prefecture throughout Japan have traditionally maintained their role 
in ensuring access, supporting basic research, and training bureaucrats, engineers, doctors, and 
teachers etc. for the nation. Until the 1990s, there was little societal or political debate on national 
university governance. “University autonomy” had been a taken-for-granted principle and practice 
in postwar Japanese higher education. There was a tacit arrangement on the role of each actor. The 
The Construction of the Competitive University in Japan
5Ministry of Education controlled the policy and the budget. Universities were run by faculty 
councils and senate. Faculty members were free to pursue their research. Industries expected little 
from universities other than graduates with general skills to be trained by corporate in-house 
programs throughout the course of a lifelong career. 
This tacit arrangement began to collapse after the bubble economy ended in the early 1990s. 
Japanese politicians began to point finger on national universities for their inefficiency, inflexibility, 
declining quality, and inability to help resurrect a sluggish economy. Industries, which could no 
longer afford the high training costs, now expect universities to produce immediately usable and 
highly specialized labor force. The general public debates the social and economic relevancy of 
university education and research. Drastic population decline (Japanese universities expect full 
enrollment by 2007, after which overall supply will exceed demand) on the one hand and the 
globalization of higher education on the other translate into heightened competition among 
universities in Japan. In a period of fiscal austerity, national universities, like many other public 
sectors (postal services, health, and pensions etc.) have become a target of structural reforms. 
Since the late 1990s, Japanese national university reform has become part of a larger 
political debate on restructuring. In 1997, the Hashimoto Cabinet decided on a 10% overall 
reduction of the number of civil servants over ten years. It was then further increased to 20% by the 
succeeding Obuchi administration (Tabata 2005). In 1999, the General Law on Independent 
Administrative Institutions (IAIs) was passed. Under this scheme, many public services are now 
provided by independent administrative institutions. Ministries formulate three-to-five year mid-
term policy objectives while the IAIs submit their plans in accordance with these objectives, 
maintain autonomous management and operations, and are subject to mid-term evaluation. The 
national university sector, which had a 135,000-strong payroll, became an inevitable target of 
administrative restructuring to relieve the national personnel budget. Based on the IAI scheme, the 
6National University Corporation Law was passed in 2003 through which all national universities 
were turned into individual independent corporate entities in April 2004. 
The National University Corporation Law aims at increasing the autonomy and flexibility of 
university governance, budgeting, non-civil servant personnel recruitment, curriculum, and third-
party evaluations. Under the new governance structure, MEXT is responsible for the six-year 
objectives of each university. Each university in turn submits its six-year plan to MEXT. In addition 
to the evaluation at the end of each six-year cycle, universities are also required to submit annual 
evaluation reports, which would determine the funding level of the next academic year. In this new 
scheme, the university president, who previously had more a symbolic status, has now increased 
power and autonomy vis-à-vis the traditional faculty councils and senate. Decision-making power 
also centers on a board of directors comprised of at least one external person. In terms of finance, 
while over half of the total operating budget of each national university continues to be provided by 
MEXT, it is reduced by 1% per year. Universities and individual faculty are instead encouraged to 
obtain various kinds of competitive research funds and external funding. Finally, all national 
university employees including faculty members, technicians, and nurses in the case of university 
hospitals are no long public civil servants. The law has also made it legal and easier to use short-
term labor contracts. The central idea of the National University Corporations Law is to introduce 
market principles in university governance, fund raising, academic labor management, performance 
evaluation, and university-industry cooperation in order to make Japanese universities globally 
competitive on the one hand and locally responsive to rapidly changing social and economic needs 
on the other. 
The incorporation of Japanese national universities was carried out in parallel to another 
more general development in economic restructuring. One of the perceived problems for Japan’s 
lingering economic recession is overregulation. In the area of higher education, the rigid legal and 
7bureaucratic requirements for university establishment and operations have long been considered as 
business unfriendly.1 The 1956 , for example, require all 
higher education institutions to have a significant start-up capital, exclusive university premise, and 
non-profit purpose etc. In order to ease these regulations so as to stimulate business, the Minister for 
Trade, Economy, and Industry (METI), Takeo Hiranuma, and four private-sector members of the 
Council for Economic and Fiscal Policy proposed the idea of Special Zones for Structural Reform 
in April 2002, zones within Japan that would be deregulated to promote economic revitalization.2
The Headquarters for the Promotion of Special Zones for Structural Reform, with the Prime 
Minister as its director, was formed within the Cabinet Secretariat in July and subsequently the Law 
on Special Zone for Structural Reform was passed in December the same year.3 The Cabinet 
Secretariat explains the rationale of the law:
Regulatory reforms are not being implemented as planned in some sectors for a variety of 
reasons… To stimulate the Japanese economy, it is necessary to elicit private-sector vitality 
to the maximum extent, and to expand private-sector business by implementing regulatory 
reforms. By setting up specified zones where regulatory exceptions are established in 
accordance with the zones’ specific circumstances, based on voluntary plans proposed by 
municipal bodies, private sector enterprises, etc., we promote structural reforms in the area. 
By publicizing successful case examples of structural reforms in specified areas, regulatory 
reforms can be extended to the whole country, and we can stimulate the economy of Japan 
as a whole.4
Behind this bold initiative, competition is the key principle. Municipalities and the private sector 
submit project proposals for approval by the concerned ministries and the Prime Minister. The 
targeted exceptions to regulations to be implemented in Special Zones are compiled into a list. The 
projects are assessed after one year. In the absence of any significant problem, the exceptions to 
existing regulations could be extended to the whole country.
In the area of education, from April 2003 to May 2005, MEXT approved a total of 186 
applications of exceptions to regulations to be implemented in Special Zones across the country 
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8from Hokkaido to Okinawa in nineteen categories from kindergarten operations to the establishment 
of for-profit high schools.5 LEC Tokyo, which had been one of the four key law preparatory cram 
schools in Japan, became the first for-profit university in Japan in 2004 and has since been renamed 
as the LEC Tokyo Legal Mind University.6 Digital Hollywood, first formed in 1994 to train 
students in the creative industries, also became a University that same year.7 The distance-learning-
based business graduate school, Business Breakthrough, established by the renowned Japanese 
business guru, Ohmae Kenichi, also became a university under the new Special Zone scheme. Six 
more pro-profit universities are scheduled to open in 2006 including WAO Graduate School in 
digital animation, TAC Graduate School in accounting, Globis MBA Graduate School, LCA MBA 
Graduate School, Japan Education Graduate School, and Japan Interpretation Graduate School.8
Pressures to reform Japanese national universities dated back to the Nakasone administration 
two decades ago. Seen in this historical context, university reform in Japan is not only a product of 
government financial pinch in the post-bubble period of the 1990s but also a consistent target of the 
dominant conservative LDP. It is well known that Prime Minister Nakasone was a great admirer of 
Ronald Reagan. In as early as 1984, the leading organization of businessmen, Committee for 
Economic Development ( ), argued that Japan needed the next generation of workers 
to be “creative, diverse, and internationally-minded” (Schoppa 1991). That year, Nakasone 
established the  (Ad Hoc University Council) to revise the Standards for the 
Establishment of Universities, “eliminating uniformity in education” and providing “regulatory 
relief” for universities (Schoppa 1991). Attempts to incorporatize national universities, notably 
under the ex-Minister of Education, Nagai Michio, largely failed due to opposition from the 
Ministry of Education.9
Neoliberal Ideology and University Restructuring in Japan
Keizai Doyukai
Daigaku Shingikai
9It was not until the Hashimoto administration in 1997 that the issue became a heated 
political debate. When the idea of writing the entire national university sector off the national 
budget through the independent administrative institution scheme was floated by LDP politicians, 
the Ministry of Education vehemently opposed it, out of the obvious concern of losing its 
bureaucratic power, if not part of its raison d’être.10 In May 2000, the Policy Affairs Research 
Group within LDP issued a statement that while national universities should be incorporated, the 
general IAI scheme might not be applicable. The following month, Japan Association of National 
Universities, represented by national university presidents, maintained their strong opposition to the 
IAI idea at the annual meeting. In June 2002, as a political compromise, a Cabinet decision 
announced that national universities would be incorporated under a separate scheme/law, which 
some critics argue, fundamentally resembles the basic IAI structure (Miyoshi 1999). The National 
University Corporation Law was finally passed in 2003. 
To understand how such a sweeping reform measure changing the legal structure, 
governance pattern, and status of all 130,000 employees of national universities was undertaken, 
one needs to look at the “triumvirate” collusion of interests between the LDP, Keidanren (Japan 
Business Federation), and the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry. LDP politicians have been 
targeting Japanese national university reforms through two separate, though linked, ideologies. One, 
manifested in the “small government” discourse of the Koizumi administration since 2001, focuses 
on the fiscal dimension of Japanese national university restructuring. The other, led by conservative 
politicians such as Omi Koji, aims more specifically on revitalizing Japanese universities for 
economic growth, especially through a proactive science and technology policy.11
These two dominant LDP positions on national university reforms—on fiscal performance 
and national economic growth— have been both pushed by Keidanren. In the post-bubble period, 
Keidanren has issued numerous position papers arguing for university restructuring.12 It lobbied for 
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the passage of several important laws concerning industry-university relations. In 1995, the Basic 
Law on Science and Technology (S&T) was passed, which led to the establishment of the First 
Basic Plan on S& T in 1996 with a budget of 17 billion yen. In 1998, the Law to Promote 
Technology Transfer from Universities to Industry through the establishment of technology 
licensing offices was further promulgated. The following year, the Special Measures to Promote 
Industrial Revitalization (the so-called Japanese Bayh Dole Act) were passed. In 2000, the Basic 
Law on Intellectual Property was adopted to promote the transfer of university technology to 
industry, an area that has widely been criticized as underdeveloped in Japan (Sawa et al. 2005). In 
2001, Keidanren created a Sub-Committee on Industry-University Promotion within the Committee 
on Industrial Technology to promote research and development within universities and human 
resource development. The Sub-Committee put in place a new, more institutionalized internship 
system and initiatives that allow more flexible exchanges between university and corporate 
researchers/personnel.13
National university reform has also been actively promoted by the Ministry of Economy, 
Trade, and Industry. In 2001, an informal policy group was created in the Industry Research 
Institute within METI, which targeted faculty councils and university autonomy as impediments to 
increasing the quantity and quality of Japanese information technology researchers.14 On May 25 
2001, the Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry Takeo Hiranuma presented the “Hiranuma 
Plan” containing specific measures to encourage new market and job creation through wholesale 
university reform. The Hiranuma Plan spurred MEXT into action.15 On June 11, the Minister of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Toyama Atsuko, submitted instead the 
Toyama Plan to the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, which was chaired by the Prime 
Minister and whose objective was to revitalize the stagnant Japanese economy. The Toyama Plan 
centered on three controversial ideas: 1) to drastically promote reorganization and consolidation of 
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national universities, the so-called Scrap and Build approach; 2) to introduce management methods 
used in the private sector to the management of national universities; and 3) to introduce a 
competitive principle to universities by means of external evaluation, or the so-called “Top 30 
Universities,” which have since been renamed as the Center of Excellence program, as a mechanism 
of competitive funding.  
The National University Corporation Law and the deregulation of universities through the 
Law on Special Zone for Structural Reform represent a defeat of MEXT in its bureaucratic battle 
with the Ministry of Finance and METI.16 The political compromise allows MEXT to retain some 
control of national universities through the setting of six-year goals and evaluation. Above all, 
MEXT attempts to maintain the discursive control of national university corporation as university 
reform proper, rather than the victim of an administrative reform coup:
The corporation of national universities, as confirmed by a cabinet decision, should be 
reviewed as a part of the promotion of university reform. That is to say, it is assumed that 
this problem will be reviewed as a part of creating dynamic universities that are 
internationally competitive, exceeding the perspective of the so-called administrative reform, 
such as outsourcing of administrative functions, and improving the efficiency of 
management, and promoting the flow of conventional university reform, such as upgrading 
education and research, creating individualistic universities, and revitalizing university 
administration (MEXT 2002: 2). 
In particular, since the 1999 Cabinet decision to consider the incorporation of national universities,
MEXT has insisted on framing the imposed reforms around the OECD discourse of “knowledge-
based society.” In its 2003 education White Paper, MEXT articulates its vision of “Higher 
Education in Support of a Knowledge-Based Society Full of Creative Vitality - New Development 
for Higher Education Reforms:”
In the so-called “knowledge-based society,” in which new technologies and information has 
become the foundation for various social activities… universities bear the role of … 
knowledge creation… In addition, the role of universities and other institutions in Japan has 
come to be recognized once again as a means to strengthen industrial competitiveness and 
ensure employment… Responding to social structural change, universities are also at the 
12
stage where they must construct a new image for themselves, one in which they can 
appropriately fulfill the role that is expected of them in the new society (p. 6-7).  
This new outlook for Japanese universities emphasizes competitiveness, productivity, flexibility, 
and efficiency. Although MEXT lost the bureaucratic battle, in the eyes of its own staff and its 
constituents— university employees, students, parents, and the society in general—it justifies the 
far-reaching reform measures by couching them in legitimate global discourse of the competitive 
21st century university. 
Why have university faculty and staff unions failed to stop the drastic reform measures? There 
was opposition at all levels. From early on, the Japan Association of National Universities (JANU), 
which represents national university leadership, objected to national university incorporation. The 
main Faculty and Staff Union of Japanese Universities ( ) also opposed. Throughout 
national universities in Japan, faculties and departments adopted resolutions against the National 
University Corporation Law. In particular, a dozen of professors in the fields of education, history, 
geography, and philosophy from the University of Tokyo, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, and 
Chiba University formed the Shutoken Net (Tokyo Anti-incorporation Network) in 1999. It drew 
upon the structure and memberships of existing faculty and staff union within national universities 
and tried to formulate a coherent strategy against the reforms. The results of their action—
information dissemination, signature petition, demonstration, media campaign, and lobbying Diet 
members—are reflected in the 33 resolutions that accompanied the passage of the National 
University Corporation Law in 2003, even though the resolutions are not legally binding. Since 
1999, several graduate students from the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies have also formed a 
study group and mailing list to oppose university reforms that they believe curtail academic 
freedoms and eliminate disciplines that are not “practical.” Undergraduates have also mobilized. 
Opposition to National University Reforms
Zendaikyo
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Student unions at the Tokyo University and Tohoku University adopted resolutions opposing the 
law. Further, in 2002, student union members from several national universities formed a human 
chain around MEXT to protest against national university corporation.17
The inability to stop the National University Corporation Law and related reform measures 
reflects several structural problems faced by Japanese faculty and staff as well as student unions. 
Some university faculty union members pointed out the traditionally close relationship between 
JANU and MEXT as a key factor in their inability to mobilize against national university 
corporation. Although JANU had opposed initially, it “gave in” too early to the demands of MEXT, 
after which it became quasi impossible for individual national university to object to the proposed 
plan.18 The response of the university faculty and staff unions in turn has been fragmented and weak. 
At the national federated level, Japanese teachers’ unions are divided along ideological and political 
lines with the leading Japan Teachers’ Union (Nikkyoso) affiliated with the opposition Democratic 
Party, the National Teachers Federation of Japan (Zen-Nikkyoren) affiliated with the Liberal 
Democratic Party, and finally All Japan Teachers and Staff Union (Zenkyo) associated with the 
Communist Party. University faculty and staff unions are federated under separate structures of the 
main Faculty and Staff Union of Japanese Universities ((Zendaikyo, across political party lines) and 
the much smaller Japan Public University Staff Union (Zenikkyo, associated with Nikkyoso). Some 
faculty union members pinpoint their failure to stop the reform measures to the lack of power, if not 
a consensual approach, of the Faculty and Staff Union of Japanese Universities vis-à-vis MEXT.19
In addition to the problem of ideological division and the lack of unity, all teachers and faculty 
unions have been suffering from declining membership rates. A fundamental question pertains to 
how a union structure and approach based on the industrial era can still be effective in a 
postindustrial society; that is, how an extremely hierarchical structure could adapt to the rapidly 
changing labor changes in the era of globalization.20 The weak linkage between teachers’ unions 
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and political parties in Japan further means that the opposition movement by the faculty and staff 
unions had little political leverage. 
Opposition at the level of the university remained weak due to the absence of staff unions in 
many Japanese universities, a legacy of the 1968 university turmoil. In campuses where staff unions 
are present, the low membership rate on the one hand and lack of consensus concerning the merits 
and demerits of university corporation among faculty and staff members on the other have made 
organizing a challenge. Further, since the corporation impacts various faculties, departments, and 
even individual academics differently, there has been no uniformed response to the law. Some 
faculties especially in the sciences and engineering seem to favor the development from the 
perspective of flexibility and increased external funding possibilities while others in arts, humanities, 
and basic sciences find the selective support approach an infringement of university research 
autonomy. Many academics seem to be against the law, but few took action.21
Finally, despite the fact that students—graduate as well as undergraduate—have great stakes 
in the current trends of university incorporation and marketization, as they exert significant impact 
on tuition fee, academic discipline restructuring, university management, and hence their university 
education experience as a whole, student opposition has been marginal and ineffective. With the 
exception of a few student unions and graduate student networks, for example, in the Komaba
campus of the University of Tokyo and Chiba University, most students remain oblivious to the 
recent reforms. The lack of mobilization could be attributed to the absence of student unions in most 
Japanese universities, a product of the Ministry of Education policy after the radical student 
activism of the 1960s as well as the general decline of student interest in activism in the prosperous 
decades of the 1970s and 1980s.22
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Almost two years after the National University Corporation Law took effect, Japanese 
national universities have become battlegrounds for new missions, innovative governance structures, 
decreased funding, flexible personnel arrangements, and heightened performance and global 
competitiveness. Universities have responded differently to these new challenges. Faced with the 
budget squeeze, some have chosen to freeze hiring23 while others experiment outsourcing in order 
to reduce personnel costs.24 Faculty and staff members alike complain of the massive increase of 
administrative workload due to mid-term planning, annual evaluations, and competitive funding 
applications.25 University presidents can now be chosen by the President Selection Committee 
without the traditional faculty vote. External experts now sit on university boards and could 
legitimately introduce market-oriented ideas and activities. One such example is the development of 
Tokyo University employee and student identity cards as credit cards. In the spirit of “Scrap and 
Build,” some university management teams have begun to think the unthinkable: eliminating entire 
faculties that are no longer profitable or useful and replacing them with more practical and locally 
adapted disciplines.26
Although the National University Corporation Law has become a legal reality, the actual 
extent of changes will not only depend on university leadership, which has been the active agents 
spearheading reforms, but also on the acceptance of the middle management (deans and department 
heads etc.) as well as individual academics. Many scholars and practitioners have pointed out the 
trends of marketization of Japanese higher education from funding to enrollment (Yano 2005 and 
Yamamoto 2005), but faculty members on the ground continue to question the legitimacy of such 
top-down reforms that challenge the principles underlying postwar higher education system as well 
as the social fabric in Japan. These include the equality of opportunity, university autonomy, higher 
education as a public good, and stable employment.27 As President Komiyama Hiroshi of the 
Conclusion: Academic Capitalism and the Social Contract
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University of Tokyo affirmed in a recent gathering of undergraduates from around the world, the 
mission of the University of Tokyo, as stipulated in the 2003 university charter, is not only to 
perform world-class research and education, but also to serve the public good of the world, from an 
Asian perspective.28 The learning, teaching, and research experience of individual students, faculty, 
and staff members will depend on a tug of war between a neoliberal ideology focusing on the 
market and commitments to the existing social contract that emphasizes university functions beyond 
market values. At stake is not only the ranking of Japanese universities, or but also the democratic 
future of Japan.
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